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(RE)INTRODUCTION
On September, 30, 2011, the U.S. policy of "Targeted Killing"
against individuals linked with terrorist activities extended for the first
reported time to one of its own citizens: United States born Anwar AlAulaqi.1 In doing so, the United States reignited the debate
surrounding the legality of its policy, a debate to which this article
aims to contribute.
Part I of this two-part article laid the foundations for the overall
argument, via an analysis of the legal justifications for targeted killing
forwarded by the United States, before addressing the first set of legal
f Part I of this article was published in 44 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 39 (2013-2014).
. LLB (Leeds), LLM Candidate, Faculty of Law and Queens' College,
University of Cambridge. I am deeply grateful for the invaluable guidance and
support of Professor Surya P. Subedi OBE, Dr. Anthony Cullen, and Dr. Amrita
Mukherjee. The views presented, and any errors or omissions, are solely those of
the author.
1 Obituary:Anwar al-Awlaki, BBC NEWS, Sept. 30, 2011.
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issues identified under the framework of jus ad bellum. Under this
framework it was concluded that, on the known facts of the Al-Aulaqi
strike, there are strong arguments to suggest illegality on the part of
the United States. This illegality arose due to the lack of an imminent
armed attack to allow the United States to claim it responded in selfdefense.
The analysis in Part II develops the overall thesis proposed by this
author, namely that the targeted killing of Anwar Al-Aulaqi must be
evaluated under both jus ad bellum and the "law enforcement"
paradigm of International Human Rights Law (IHRL). In doing so,
this article analyzes the United States' invocation of a noninternational armed conflict (NIAC) to encompass the Al-Aulaqi
strike, consequently triggering the more permissive rules of
International Humanitarian Law (IHL).
After concluding that the strike may not be justified as falling
within the scope of any armed conflict in which the United States was
engaged at that time, this Article continues to consider whether the
strike is justifiable under the true applicable law, IHRL. In doing so, a
final conclusion as to the legality of the Al-Aulaqi strike will be
reached; a conclusion that may have far-reaching implications for the
legality of the U.S. policy of conducting "Targeted Killings" within
States such as Yemen, Pakistan, and Somalia.
III. Jus IN BELLO: THE CLASSIFICATION OF ARMED CONFLICT

There is a complete separation between jus ad bellum and jus in
bello;2 wherever there is a de facto armed conflict, IHL applies. 3
Legality under one framework does not equate to legality under the
other. Following jus ad bellum, the analysis of the Al-Aulaqi strike
faces a juncture of two paradigms. If the strike can be brought within
the context of an armed conflict, the 'normative paradigm of

2. Marko Milanovic & Vidan Hadzi-Videanovic, A Taxonomy of Armed
Conflict, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND SECURITY
LAW: JUS AD BELLUM, Jus IN BELLO AND JUS POST BELLUM 264-68 (Nigel D. White

& Christian Henderson eds., 2013) [hereinafter Milanovic & Hadzi-Videanovic].
3. 1 MARCO SASSOLI & ANTOINE BOUVIER, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS
[ICRC], How DOES LAW PROTECT IN WAR? CASES, DOCUMENTS AND TEACHING
MATERIALS ON CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

103 (2d ed. 2006).
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hostilities' featuring the complementary regimes of IHL and IIHRL
will be triggered. If, at the time of the strike,4 there is no armed
conflict to which the strike is referable, the law enforcement paradigm
of IHRL must apply. As stated in the introduction, the overall thesis
forwarded by this article is that the strike against Al-Aulaqi was
outside of the context of armed conflict. This chapter will begin by
analyzing the lex lata surrounding the classification of conflicts,
before applying the framework to the circumstances prevailing during
the Al-Aulaqi strike.
A. The ClassificationofArmed Conflicts
The authoritative 5 definition of an armed conflict is from the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
decision in Tadi 6 There, the court stated, "that an armed conflict
exists whenever there is resort to armed force between States or
protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and
organized armed groups or between such groups within a State."
However, "armed conflict" is not a generic concept.8 Preserved in this
4. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion
70 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction,
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995); see, e.g., Prosecutor v. Boskoski & Tarculovski, Case No.
IT-04-82-T, Judgment, IT 173-174 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia July
10, 2008) (showing that the threshold question for establishing the application of
IHL is that there must be an armed conflict, and that armed conflict must exist at the
time of the event in question).
5. The ICTY reiterated this authoritative definition in several cases. See, e.g.,
Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-T, Judgment, 51 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 15, 2002); Prosecutor v. Limaj et al., Case No. IT-0366-T, Judgment,
83-84 (Int'l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30,
2005); Prosecutor v. Naletilic & Martinovic, Case No. IT-98-34-T, Judgment, 225
n.597 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 31, 2003); Prosecutor v.
Haradinaj et al., Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, TT 37-38 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008); ILC Draft Articles on Effects of Armed Conflict
on Treaties, Article 2(b), Int'l Law Comm'n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.777 (May 11,
2011).
6. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 70.
7. Id.
8. That is to say that a situation is not established as "an armed conflict," and
then classified further, but it is initially classified as either an international or non-
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definition is the recognition of the two types of armed conflict
enunciated in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949:9 international
armed conflict (IAC) and non-international armed conflict (NIAC),
which will briefly be outlined before application.
1. InternationalArmed Conflict
The definition of an IAC is derived from Common Article 2(1) to
the Geneva Conventions, which states that the Geneva Conventions
"shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict
which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties,
even if the state of war is not recognized by them." 10 IAC also
includes national liberation movements." While IAC requires no real
threshold of violence or duration,12 and is merely a "resort to armed

international armed conflict. Milanovic & Hadzi-Videanovic, supra note 2, at 26972.
9. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S.
31 [hereinafter First Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration
of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at
Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Second Geneva
Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva
Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Aug. 12 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth
Geneva Convention] [collectively hereinafter Geneva Conventions].
10. Geneva Conventions, supra note 9, at art. 2(1). Also including, "all cases
of total or partial occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party." Id. at art.
2(2).
11. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I)
art. 1(4), June 8 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. Although, Anthony Cullen notes that Article
1(4) "has never positively enabled the application of the Protocol." ANTHONY
CULLEN, THE CONCEPT OF NON-INTERNATIONAL
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAw 85 (2010).

ARMED

CONFLICT

IN

12. I INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS [ICRC], COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA
CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND

SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 32 (Jean S. Pictet, ed., 1952) [hereinafter

Pictet].
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force between States,"13 it is clear from the text of Common Article 2
that the provision only applies to conflicts between States.14
2. Non-InternationalArmed Conflict

Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions provides minimum
protections 15 granted to participants "in the case of armed conflict not
of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the
High Contracting Parties."' 6 Deliberately, no threshold to establish a
NIAC was provided by the Convention.' 7 However, the ICTY
judgment in Tadic posited that:
The test applied .. . to the existence of an armed conflict for the
purposes of the rules contained in Common Article 3 focuses on
two aspects of a conflict; the intensity of the conflict and the
organization of the parties to the conflict.' 8

13. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 70.
14. "Any difference arising between two States and leading to the intervention
of armed forces is an armed conflict within the meaning of Article 2, even if one of
the Parties denies the existence of a state of war." Pictet, supra note 12, at 32
(emphasis added); see also Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ff 70; YORAM DINSTEIN, THE
CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT
28 (2d ed., 2010); NOAM LUBELL, EXTRATERRITORIAL USE OF FORCE AGAINST

NON-STATE ACTORS 95-96 (1st ed. 2010) [hereinafter LUBELL, EXTRATERRITORIAL
USE OF FORCE]; NLS MELZER, TARGETED KILLING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 251 (1st

ed. 2008); Jens David Ohlin, Is Jus in Bello in Crisis?, 11 J. INT'L CRIM. J. 27, 30
(2013); Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions,
Study on Targeted Killings, Int'l Law Comm'n, U.N. Doc. No. A/HRC/14/24/Add.
6, 1 51 (May 28, 2010) (by Philip Alston) [hereinafter Alston]; ICRC, How is the
Term "Armed Conflict" Defined in InternationalHumanitarianLaw?, at 5 (Mar. 17,
2008), http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf.
15. It has been described as a "Convention in miniature." Pictet, supra note
12, at 48.
16. Second Geneva Convention, supra note 9, at art. 3.
17. Pictet, supra note 12, at 49.
18. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, 562
Yugoslavia May
7,
1997),
for the Former
(Int'l Crim. Trib.
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/tjug/en/tad-tsj70507JT2-e.pdf.
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This test received endorsement as authoritative in the ICTY,19
ICTR, 20 and ICC, 2 1 and requires the fulfilment of two criteria: 1) a
level of organization in the parties, and 2) a threshold of intensity to
the hostilities.2 2 The substantive content and interpretation of these
requirements will be considered further during application.
B. Identifying an Armed Conflictfor the Strike Against Al-Aulaqi
Prima facie, extraterritorial drone strikes against transnational
non-State actors do not fit neatly into either of the pre-existing legal
categories. 23 The drafters of the Geneva Conventions could hardly
have foreseen the advances in modem warfare. However, the lex lata
appears to have maintained, for now, the traditional dichotomy of IAC
and NIAC. 2 4 The key question remaining is whether these existing
concepts allow the strike against Al-Aulaqi to be subsumed within an
identifiable armed conflict. There are three potential scenarios that
must be examined.

19. E.g., Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, 184 (Int'l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
former
Yugoslavia
Nov.
16
1998),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/tjug/en/981116judg-en.pdf.
20. E.g., Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 1 619
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Sept. 2 1998); Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No.
ICTR-96-3-T, Trial Judgment, 92 (Dec, 6, 1999).
21. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges, 1223 (Jan. 29, 2007).
22. Cullen, supra note 11, at 191.
23. Noam Lubell & Nathan Derejko, A Global Battlefield? Drones and the
GeographicalScope of Armed Conflict, 11 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 65, 65-67 (2013)
[hereinafter Lubell & Derejko]; LUBELL, EXTRATERRITORIAL USE OF FORCE, supra
note 14, at 93-94.
24. While a small minority of jurists have posited the emergence of a
"transnational armed conflict" as a recognized legal concept in addition to IAC and
NIAC, the dominant viewpoint among jurists is that these are the only types of
armed conflicts recognized in the current lex lata. Naom Lubell, The War (?)
Against Al-Qaeda, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS
421, 431 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst, ed., 2012) [hereinafter Lubell, The War (?)];
LUBELL, EXTRATERRITORIAL USE OF FORCE, supra note 14, at 421-39; Milanovic &
Hadzi-Vidanovic, supra note 1, at 43; MELZER, supra note 14, at 269 (1st ed. 2008);
JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 7-5466, ISSUES RELATED TO THE
LETHAL TARGETING OF U.S. CITIZENS SUSPECTED OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES 5
(2012).
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1. The Al-Aulaqi Strike as Partof an Armed Conflict With AlQaeda
The first scenario requires consideration of whether the United
States is engaged in a global IAC or NIAC against Al-Qaeda, which
includes the Al-Aulaqi strike. Applying this framework, it is clear that
Al-Qaeda is not a State. Therefore, it can briskly be concluded that the
purported armed conflict with Al-Qaeda is not an IAC.2 5 However, a
NIAC is not so quickly dismissed.
In the Department of Justice White Paper, the United States
justified its global strikes as part of a NIAC with Al-Qaeda. 26
However, there are two primary difficulties with this justification that
must be addressed. First, this justification misappropriates the U.S.
Supreme Court's ruling in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.2 7 While the decision
in Hamdan found the existence of a NIAC against Al-Qaeda in
Afghanistan, the judgment cannot be used as sole authority for a
global armed conflict beyond "hot" battlefields such as Afghanistan.
Second, the reasoning in Hamdan is clearly open to criticism. 28 The
court merely asserted a NIAC by deletion. In other words, because
the conflict between the United States and Al-Qaeda was not an IAC,

25. Alston, supra note 14, at 17 n.99; see also Arabella Thorpe, Drone Attacks
and the Killing of Anwar Al-Aulaqi, House of Commons Standard Note 06165 3
(Dec. 20, 2011); Lubell, The War (?), supra note 24, at 431.
26. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 628-31 (2006). In Hamdan,
the U.S. Supreme Court held that a conflict between a nation and a transnational
non-state actor, occurring outside the nation's territory, is an armed conflict "not of
an international character." Id. at 628-31 (as cited in U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, WHITE
PAPER, LAWFULNESS OF A LETHAL OPERATION DIRECTED AGAINST A U.S. CITIZEN
WHO IS A SENIOR OPERATIONAL LEADER OF AL-QA'IDA OR AN ASSOCIATED FORCE 3

(2011) [hereinafter DOJ WHITE PAPER], available at

http://www.justice.gov/oip/docs/dept-white-paper.pdf); see Jake W. Rylatt, An
Evaluation of the U.S. Policy of "Targeted Killing" UnderInternationalLaw: The
Case ofAnwar Al-Aulaqi (pt. 1), 44(1) CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 39, 47-48 (2013)
(explaining that the DOJ White Paper was "leaked" to the press in March 2013, and
outlines the United States' legal justification for its policy of targeted killings).
27. Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557.
28. See, e.g., Michael Ramsden, TargetedKillings andInternationalHuman
Rights Law: The Case ofAnwarAl-Awlaki, 16(2) J. CONFLICT & SEC. LAW 385,
390 (2011).
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it must be a NIAC. 29 Indeed, the decision was purely based on a broad
interpretation of Common Article 3, relying on the commentaries to
the Geneva Conventions. 30 While previous commentators embarking
on an analysis of the Al-Aulaqi strike have taken the U.S. Supreme
Court's word as definitive authority, 3 1 doing so compounds the failure
of the Hamdan decision to consider the true geographical scope of a
NIAC.
Therefore, it must be analyzed whether, conceptually speaking, a
NIAC between the United States and a transnational non-State actor is
possible, where it spans the hot battlefield of Afghanistan as well as
the countries of Pakistan, Somalia, and most pertinently, Yemen. 32 Is
there a legal geography of war?33
The basis of this analysis 34 is Common Article 3 to the Geneva
Conventions. Read literally, Common Article 3 speaks of an armed
conflict "occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting
Parties." 35 Such a reading gives rise to the argument that non-

29. Id. at 390 (citing John C. Dehn & Kevin Jon Heller, Targeted Killing: The
Case ofAnwar Al-Aulaqi, 159 U. PA. L. REv. 175, 190-91 (2011)).
30. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 631.
31. Farley takes as settled that "[tihe United States is engaged in a noninternational armed conflict with Al-Qaeda." Benjamin R. Farley, Targeting Anwar
Al-Aulaqi: A Case Study in U.S. Drone Strikes and Targeted Killing, 2(1) AM. UNIV.
NAT'L SEC. L. BRIEF 57, 73 (2012).
32. Lubell & Derejko, supra note 23, at 82-83.
33. See generally Kenneth Anderson, The Targeted Killing and Drone
Warfare: How We Came to a Debate Whether There is a 'Legal Geographyof War,'
in FUTURE CHALLENGES IN NATIONAL SECURITY AND LAW (Peter Berkowitz ed.,
2011).
34. As the Unites States is not party to Additional Protocol II, analysis of its
scope of application will be outside this article. However, it is noted that Article 1(1)
explicitly limits its application to conflicts taking place in the territory of a State
between its own armed forces and non-State actors. ICRC, Protocol Additional to
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relatingto the Protectionof Victims
of Non-InternationalArmed Conflicts (Protocol 11), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609,
Article 1(1); ICRC, Customary Int'l Humanitarian Law (2005) (Jean-Marie
Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck).
35. Second Geneva Convention, supra note 9.
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international must be equated with internal,36 which is a view that
finds support in the original commentaries. 37
In addition, recourse to the travaux prdparatoiresof the Geneva
Conventions is instructive as a subsidiary means of interpretation. 3 8
The original draft of Common Article 3 was applicable "in all cases of
armed conflict not of an international character which may occur in
the territory of one or more of the High Contracting Parties." 39 Melzer
has posited the argument that the drafters' intent did not change with
the amendment, stating that the phrase "was probably lost in the
subsequent attempts to restrict the application of the conventions." 40
However, in such a controversial Article, it is difficult to imagine that
such a change was anything less than intentional. As such, a stronger
argument, also drawing on the travaux, is that of Murphy,41 who
submits that the drafting history of Common Article 3 contemplated
an armed conflict between State and non-State actors "largely in the
context of the classic civil war." 42 Upon inspection, the statements
made by delegates appear to support this claim.4 3 Thus, there is a
strong argument that Common Article 3 speaks exclusively to
36. Christopher Greenwood, Scope of Application of Humanitarian Law, in
DIETER FLECK, THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 39-

63 (Dieter Fleck et al. eds.1995).
37. Various statements such as "internal convulsions," "internal in character,"
and "dealings with internal enemies," can be used to identify a common thread of
the internalization of NIAC. Pictet, supra note 12, at 43, 45, 50.
38. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 32, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
39. Geneva Convention, Apr. 26-Dec. 8, 1949, FinalRecord of the Diplomatic
Conference of Geneva of 1949, Vol. II-B at 107, 120.
40. MELZER, supra note 14, at 258 n.83.
41. Sean Murphy, Evolving Geneva Convention Paradigms in the "War on
Terrorism: " Applying the Core Rules to the Release of Persons Deemed
"Unprivileged Combatants," 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1105, 1116 (2007).
42. Id. at 10.
43. For example, the Soviet delegate referred to "colonial conflicts, civil wars
or any other conflicts of a non-international character" and the Mexican delegates
spoke of "all non-international wars of whatever character, whether civil wars, wars
of resistance or wars of liberation" These examples reflect that the delegates to the
Diplomatic Conference viewed Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions as
being of use purely in civil wars and other conflicts within the territory of one State.
Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, supra note 39, at
327, 333.
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conflicts of an internal character. However, it must be examined
whether such an intention has been displaced by operation of the
maxim lex posteriorderogatpriori.4 5
The jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals is vital to
interpreting the geographical scope of a NIAC. The authoritative
decision of the ICTY's decision in Tadic specifically defines a NIAC
as "protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and
organized armed groups or between such groups within a state."46 A
similar view is evident in the jurisprudence of the ICTR. For example,
the Musema case stated "non-international armed conflicts are
situations in which hostilities break out between armed forces or

organized armed groups within the territory of a single State." 47 The
cumulative effect of such decisions, particularly noting the authority
of Tadid, supports the submission that the NIAC between the United

States and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan is confined to the territory of that
State, and that State alone. 4 8

44. Cullen, supra note 11, at 49; LINDSEY MOIR, THE LAW OF INTERNAL
ARMED CONFLICT (2008); David Wippman, Do New Wars Callfor New Laws?, in
NEW WARS, NEW LAWS?: APPLYING THE LAWS OF WAR IN 21ST CENTURY

CONFLICTS 1-28 (David Wippman & Matthew Evangelista eds., 2005); Greenwood,
supra note 36, at 47.
45. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 38, at art. 31(3)(b).
46. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, f 70 (emphasis added); see also Krnojelac,
supra note 5, 1 51; Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, T 83-84; Prosecutor v.
Naletilic, Case No. IT-98-34-T, Judgment, 1 225; Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No.

37-38; Int'l Law Comm'n Draft Articles on Effects of
IT-04-84-T, Judgment,
Armed Conflict on Treaties, art. 2(b).
47. Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, Judgment and Sentence,
f 248 (Jan. 27, 2000) (emphasis added).
48. Further support for this approach can be found in the San Remo Manual,
stating that, "[n]on-international armed conflicts are armed confrontations occurring

within the territory of a single State and in which the armed forces of no other State
are engaged against the central government." MICHAEL N. SCHMITT, CHARLES H.B.
GARRAWAY & YORAM DINSTEIN, INT'L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, THE
MANUAL ON THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT, WITH
COMMENTARY 2 (2006), available at http://www.iihl.org/iihl/Documents/
The%20Manual%20on%20the%2OLaw/o20of/2ONIAC.pdf.
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Nevertheless, such a viewpoint is not without contention,
particularly in the context of drones. Citing Tadic,4 9 Rutagandaso and
Akaseyu,"' Lubell recently argued that there is a common thread
throughout jurisprudence that the scope of IHL is "independent from
the concept of hostilities, and extends to the geographical borders of
the relevant state(s)." 5 2 This progressive interpretation appropriates
the traditional "nexus" requirement, used to bring an individual's
actions within the scope of armed conflict for the purpose of a war
crimes prosecution,5 3 to extend IHL to individuals targeted in a third
State, in our case Al Aulaqi. Tadic is perhaps most instructive in
identifying his key argument, stating that "IHL continues to apply ...
in the case of internal conflicts, [in] the whole territory under the
control of a party, whether or not actual combat takes place." 54
However, such dicta followed the aforementioned passage confirming
that a NIAC takes place "within a State."55 Consequently, while the
"broad geographical scope" 56 required in the application of IHL is
evident in such dicta, nothing suggests a contrary intention that IHL is
applicable beyond the territorial confines of a single State.57 For IHL

49. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, f 70.
50. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Trial Judgment, 101 (stating that
"IHL extends throughout the territory of the State where the hostilities are
occurring").
51. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, IM635-636 (holding that IHL
"must be applied to the whole territory of the state engaged in the conflict").
52. Lubell & Derejko, supra note 23, at 70.
53. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac & Vukovic, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T
& IT-96-23/1-T, Trial Judgment, 1 402 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia
Feb. 22, 2001).
54. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, f 70 (emphasis added); Reiterated in
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic, Case Nos. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1A, Appeal Judgment, 57 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia June 12,
2002).
55. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 70 (emphasis added).
56. Cullen, supra note 11, at 141.
57. Declaration of Prof. Mary Ellen O'Connell at 7, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727
F. Supp. 2d 1 (2010) (No. 10-cv-01469).
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to be applicable outside Afghanistan, the Tadic threshold of NIAC
must have been met specifically in that third State.
2. Localized NIAC in Yemen between the United States and AlQaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
The second possibility of situating the strike against Al-Aulaqi
within the context of an armed conflict is to invoke the traditional,
territorially confined view of a NIAC, and ask whether the hostilities
between the United States and AQAP, as opposed to the wider
network of Al-Qaeda, have met the Tadi6 threshold to be classified as
a NIAC.ss
AQAP emerged in 2009 from a merger between Saudi militants
and militants associated with Al-Qaeda based in Yemen. 59 Since this
merger, AQAP has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks
against both the United States and the Yemeni government. 60 The
United States designated AQAP a "Foreign Terrorist Organization" in
January 2010.61
In terms of the parties' organization, AQAP can make a far
stronger claim than Al-Qaeda to be sufficiently organized as a party to
the conflict. Following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda
decentralized to become merely a network of semi-autonomous cells
across the world under the Al-Qaeda ideology. 62 However, AQAP is
more than an ideology, or network, and it may cogently be argued that
it possesses the requisite level of organization. However, such a
statement cannot simply be asserted.
58. A possibility mentioned, albeit not investigated, by Ashley S. Deeks.
Ashley S. Deeks, Pakistan'sSovereignty and the Killing of Osama Bin Laden, Vol.
15

Issue

11,

AM.

SOC.

OF

INT'L

LAW

(May

5,

2011),

http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/15/issue! 1l/pakistans-sovereignty-and-killingosama-bin-laden.
59. JOHN ROLLINS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41070, AL QAEDA AND
AFFILIATES: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, GLOBAL PRESENCE, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR

U.S. POLICY 14 (2011).

60. Id. at 16-17.
61. Press Statement of Philip J. Crowley, Assistant Sec'y, Bureau of Pub.
Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Designations of Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula
2010),
http://
(Jan.
19,
Leaders
and
Senior
(AQAP)
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/01/135364.htm.
62. See Rollins, supra note 59, at Summary Page.
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The Tadid threshold merely states that armed conflict occurs
whenever there is "protracted armed violence between governmental
authorities and organized armed groups." 63 Two key sources provide
further guidance. First, the authoritative commentaries to the Geneva
Conventions state that a party to a NIAC must be identifiable based on
objective criteria, including: having an organization structure with the
characteristics of a State; the use of regular military force by the State;
and a sufficient command structure that grants it the capabilities of
applying the Geneva Conventions.6 4 Second, the ICTY in the Limaj
and Others cases, confirms that parties only require "some degree of
organization" 65 to be recognized as parties to a NIAC under
international law. However, while primafacie such a standard seems
low, closer inspection reveals a number of findings that appear to
suggest a greater sophistication than initially apparent. In Limaj, the
ICTY made a number of findings that cumulatively revealed that the
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was a party to an armed conflict. 6 6
These included the facts, inter alia, that zone commanders "acted in
accordance with directions from the General Staff' 67 and "authorized
the movement of soldiers. 68 Alongside this command chain, the court
also relied on the findings that the KLA participated in political
negotiations,69 issued political statements,70 and had its own group
regulations and disciplinary procedures.n
Similar to the KLA, as discussed in the Limaj case, AQAP had
previously been described as "compartmentalized and hierarchical,
with a distinct division of labor," 72 thus evidencing a chain of
63. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 170.
64. Pictet, supra note 12, at 49-50.
65. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment,
89; see also Boskoski &
Tarculovski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment, 197.
66. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, 134.
67. Id. 98.
68. Id. 107.

69. Id.

125-129.

70. Id. 100-101.
71. Id. 1110-111.
72. Barak Barfi, Yemen on the Brink? The Resurgence of al Qaeda in Yemen,
NEW

AMERICA

FOUNDATION

2

(Jan.

25,

2010),

http://www.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/Barfi.pdf
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command; a leader, or emir, had been consistently identifiable;7 3 and
it was releasing political statements via the Inspire magazine.7 4 These
combined factors may indeed be sufficient to qualify AQAP as a party
to a NIAC.
However, it is questionable whether the hostilities reach the
requisite standard of "protracted armed violence." The standard of
protracted armed violence is used to "distinguish[] an armed conflict
from banditry, unorganized and short lived insurrections, or terrorist
activities, which are not subject to international humanitarian law," 76
and has been almost uniformly approved in the jurisprudence of the
ICTY, 77 ICTR,7 and the ICC Statute. 79 In assessing this threshold,
Vite has argued that a number of factors must be accounted for,
including "the duration of the conflict, the frequency of the acts of
violence and military operations, the nature of the weapons used,
displacement of civilians, territorial control by opposition forces [and]
the number of victims (dead, wounded, displaced persons, etc.)". 80
Applied to the specific hostilities between the United StatesAQAP, thus negating armed attacks such as 9/11 and U.S. action in
Afghanistan, there are a number of factors that strongly militate
against finding that the threshold to be considered protracted armed
violence has been reached. First, AQAP has only claimed
responsibility for a small number of attempts against U.S. persons or

73.

Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula, NAT'L COUNTERTERRORISM CTR.,

http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/aqap.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2013).
74. Id.
75. Beth Van Schaack, The Killing of Osama Bin Laden & Anwar Al- Aulaqi:
UncharteLegal Territory, 14 Y.B. OF INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. 254, 290 (2012).
76. Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1, Opinion and Judgment, 562
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997).
77. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, 1 183.
78. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 619 (reflecting the almost
uniform approval of the Tadic test of "protracted armed violence").
79. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(f), July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002). Although, Melzer notes
that the minor lexical change to "protracted armed conflict" in the ICC Statute may
prove unhelpful in interpretation. MELZER, supra note 14, at 257.
80. Sylvain Vite, Typology of Armed Conflicts in InternationalHumanitarian
Law: Legal Concepts and Actual Situations, 91 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 69, 76
(2009) (emphasis added).
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interests.81 This is reflected in reports from both the Congressional
Research Service 82 and the National Counterterrorism Center, 83 citing
only the Christmas Day 2009 failed 'shoe-bomber' in U.S. airspace
and the 2010 "parcel bombs" sent to the United States via airfreight,
as an exhaustive list of AQAP attacks up to the critical date. Under
Tadic, surely two, concealed attempts on U.S. interests are prime
examples of sporadic terrorist activities, as opposed to acts of

hostilities under an armed conflict.84 With regards to the
transformation from terrorism to armed conflict, the Supreme Court of
Israel in the Targeted Killings Case found a NIAC on the basis of a
"constant, continual and murderous wave of terrorist attacks .. ."85
While such a judgment may prove too inconsistent with the muchlower established threshold of "protracted armed violence" to be taken
verbatim, it highlights a heightened sensitivity to triggering the more
lenient law enforcement paradigm.
Second, on the opposing side of the hostilities, the strike against
Al-Aulaqi was reportedly only the 13th drone strike by the United
States against AQAP in Yemen from strikes commencing in
December 2009 and the killing of Al-Aulaqi in September 2011.86 It is
submitted that 13 strikes in 21 months would face great difficulties to
meet even the generous threshold of "protracted." 8
Third, the asymmetrical nature of the drone warfare utilized by

the United States militates against finding an armed conflict.
81. BRUCE RIEDEL, THE SEARCH FOR AL QAEDA: ITS LEADERSHIP, IDEOLOGY
AND FUTURE 155-58 (2d ed. 2010).
82. JEREMY SHARP, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34170, Yemen: Background
and U.S. Relations 8 (2012).
83. See Nat'l Counterterrorism Ctr., Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP), TERRORIST GROUPS http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/aqap.html (last visited
Jan. 17, 2014).
84. O'Connell submits that only when terrorism is carried out "so
continuously as to be the equivalent of armed conflict" will it be recognised as such.
Mary Ellen O'Connell, The Choice of Law Against Terrorism, 4 J. NAT'L SECURITY
L. & POL'Y 343, 356 (2010).
85. HCJ 769/02 Public Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Gov't of Israel, T
http://elyonl.court.gov.il/FilesENG/02/690/
at
available
[2006],
16
007/A34/02007690.A34.pdf.
86. New America Foundation, Drone Wars Yemen: Analysis, YEMEN STRIKES,
http://natsec.newamerica.net/drones/yemen/analysis (last visited Feb. 13, 2014).
87. Ramsden, supra note 28, at 390.
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Fundamental to the definition of both IAC and NIAC is the existence
of hostilities between parties.8 8 Therefore, it is "highly questionable as
to whether a one-sided drone strike can meet the threshold of intensity
for armed conflict".89
Consequently, despite the cogent arguments that the
organizational capabilities of AQAP meet the requisite threshold to be
classified as a party to a NIAC, there are strong arguments to conclude
that the level of hostilities had not yet reached the threshold of
protracted armed violence to establish an independent NIAC between
the United States and AQAP in Yemen.
3. NIAC between AQAP and Yemen, with U.S. Intervention
Finally, it is possible that the strike is encompassed within NIAC
between AQAP and Yemen, in which the United States is intervening.
A small number of jurists have supported this claim; 90 however, such
arguments seemingly fail to consider the underlying rationales behind
each party's actions, and merely assume that an equation can be drawn
between U.S. counter-terrorism operations and the internal conflict
between AQAP and the Yemeni government. 9'
Assuming, arguendo, that the threshold of a NIAC was met
between AQAP and the Yemeni military, there are strong arguments
militating against finding that the United States was intervening in this
conflict. While the United States was, at the material time, providing
economic aid to the Yemeni government, 92 no evidence suggests it
was providing military aid in the form of drone strikes. A sharp
contrast can be drawn with the present situation, where the recently
88. See Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction..
89. Lubell & Derejko, supra note 23, at 78.
90. See Robert Chesney, Who May Be Killed? Anwar al-Awlaki as a Case
Study in the International Legal Regulation of Lethal Force, 13 Y.B. INT'L
HUMANITARIAN L. 3, 33-34 (2010); Benjamin R. Farley, Targeting Anwar AlAulaqi: A Case Study in U.S. Drone Strikes and Targeted Killing, 2 AM. UNIV.
NAT'L SEC. L. BRIEF 57, 71-73 (2012).

91.
between
missiles
consider
92.

See, e.g., Chesney, supra note 90, at 31 (Chesney considers the clashes
AQAP and the Yemeni military, and the four occasions of airstrikes or
used by the United States against AQAP between 2009-2010, but fails to
whether there is a causal link, or even the intentions of each party).
SHARP, supra note 82, at 12-20.
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elected 93 President Hadi of Yemen openly declared his support for
U.S. drone strikes. 94
Furthermore, the U.S. rationale for targeting Al-Aulaqi was clear;
he was adjudged a threat against the homeland as part of a wider
perceived conflict with Al-Qaeda. This position is evident from the
forwarded U.S. legal justifications; particularly the DOJ White Paper,
which justifies strikes against "a senior operational leader of the
enemy forces who is actively engaged in planning operations to kill
Americans". 95 There is no mention of Yemeni interests in the DOJ
White Paper. Therefore, there is a clear argument that, in lieu of any
clear statements from United States or Yemeni officials, the strike was
conducted as a U.S. counter-terrorism operation for U.S. interests, as
opposed to being part of a NIAC between the Yemen and AQAP.
C. Conclusion
The preceding analysis demonstrates that there are strong
arguments militating against accepting the U.S. legal justification that
all drone strikes are encompassed within an overarching armed
conflict with the transnational State actor Al-Qaeda and its associated
groups. The traditional geographical scope of armed conflict may be
under pressure from the unique nature of transnational terrorism, but
there is no clear lex posterior to override the intent of the drafters of
the Geneva Convention.
Alternative arguments, while not pursued by the United States,
have also struggled to find rational support, unable to cross the
threshold from sporadic acts of terrorism and counter-terrorism into
the realm of a NIAC. This conclusion is made with the proviso that
such an argument is, by necessity, temporally linked to the
circumstances prevailing at the time of the Al-Aulaqi strike. The
classification of a conflict and the consequential determination of
93. "Yemen held a presidential 'election' in February 2012 with one
consensus candidate on the ballot-former Vice President Abed Rabbo Mansour al
Hadi." Id. at 4.

94. Amal Al-Yarisi, Drone Strike Kills Three Al-Qaeda Terror Suspects in
Marib
Governorate,
YEMEN
TIMES
(Jan.
24,
2013),
http://www.yementimes.com/en/l 645/news/i 889/Drone-strike-kills-three-Al-Qaedaterror-suspects-in-Marib-govemorate.htm.
95. DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 26, at 1.
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applicable law must occur at the time of the strike. 96 Cogent of this
fact, it may now be that the situation has evolved. However, in the
circumstances prevailing on September 30, 2011, this argument
cannot reasonably be maintained.
Therefore, this Article's final chapter considers the various issues
surrounding the framework which governs the killing of Al-Aulaqi;
the 'law enforcement' paradigm of IHRL.
IV. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: TARGETING ANWAR
AULAQI UNDER THE 'LAW ENFORCEMENT' PARADIGM

AL-

As noted in Chapter I, at no point over the last ten years has the
United States attempted to consider IHRL,97 even in the DOJ White
Paper. 98 However, upon previously establishing that it would be
difficult for the United States to justify the killing of Al-Aulaqi in the
context of an armed conflict, the IHRL's "law enforcement paradigm"
provides the sole legal framework under which the analysis of targeted
killings is considered. 99 While the law enforcement paradigm may
seem like an unlikely match for extraterritorial operations involving
drones, far removed from the traditional "shoot-to-kill" policies
normally associated with the paradigm, it does not only apply "to
police forces or in times of peace." 00
Prima facie, under the law enforcement paradigm, the targeted
killing of Al-Aulaqi breached the right to life. The right to life is
enunciated in every major international human rights instrument,101
96. Boskoski & Tarculovski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment; Rutaganda,
Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Trial Judgment,
92-93; Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T,
Judgment.
97. JENNIFER ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., Legal Issues Related to the

Lethal Targeting of U.S. Citizens Suspected of Terrorist Activities 20 (2012).
98. See David Kaye, InternationalLaw Issues in the Department ofJustice
White Paperon Targeted Killing, 17 AM. Soc'Y OF INT'L L. (Feb. 15, 2013) available
at
http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/17/issue/8/international-law-issuesdepartment-justice-white-paper-targeted-killing.
99. MELZER, supra note 14, at 278.

100. Alston, supra note 14, at 10; see also Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion,
2004 I.C.J. 136,
104-106 (July 9) [hereinafter Wall Advisory Opinion].
101. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights art. 4, June 27, 1981, 21
I.L.M. 58; American Convention on Human Rights art. 4, Nov. 22 1969, 1144
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and is conventionally binding on the United States as a signatory to
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),10 2
taking the form of a non-derogable right, even in times of public
emergency. 103 Article 6 provides that "[e]very human being has the
inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall
be arbitrarily deprived of his life." 04
However, two highly contentious areas require evaluation before
reaching a final conclusion on legality: first, whether the ICCPR
applies to operations conducted outside of the United States; second,
whether the substantial obligation to respect and ensure the right to
life in Article 6 allows, in the circumstances, for the killing of AlAulaqi.

U.N.T.S. 143, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36; International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights art. 6, Dec. 16, 1966, 1916 U.S.T. 521, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force
Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]; European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 2, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222
[hereinafter ECHR]; Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 3, G.A. Res. 217
(III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(iii) (Dec. 10, 1948).
102. InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNITED NATIONS
2014),
(Jan.
11,
DATABASE
TREATY
COLLECTION
http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg-no=IV4&chapter-4&lang-en.
103. Article 4(1) provides that:
In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the
existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the
present Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations
under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies
of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their
other obligations under international law and do not involve
discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion
or social origin.
ICCPR,supra note 101. However, article 4(2) provides that the right to life (article
6) is non-derogable. Id. "State parties may in no circumstances invoke article 4 of
the Covenant as justification for acting in violation of humanitarian law or
peremptory norms of international law[.]" U.N. Human Rights Comm., General
Comment No. 29: Article 4: Derogations during a State of Emergency
11,
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 11 (2001). Non-derogable rights are those rights listed in
Article 4(2) ICCPR which may never be suspended, even in times of emergency that
threaten the life of the nation.
104. ICCPR, supra note 101, art. 6.
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A. The ExtraterritorialApplication ofHuman Rights Treaties
The U.S. position is, and always has been, that the ICCPR does
not apply extraterritorially.'os Accepting this premise would mean that
the domestic authority of the AUMF would solely govern an
extraterritorial strike outside the context of armed conflict. Support for
the U.S. position is derived from the text of Article 2(1) of the ICCPR,
which provides that "[e]ach State Party to the present Covenant
undertakes to respect and ensure to all individuals within its territory
and subject to its jurisdiction the right recognised in the present

Covenant."

06

The United States has argued that the wording of Article 2(1)
"restricted the scope of the Covenant to persons under U.S.
jurisdiction and U.S. territory," 0 7 reading the two phrases
conjunctively. However, this position has been rejected on numerous
occasions, with the interpretative guidance of the UN Human Rights
Committee, stating that Article 2(1) requires that "State parties ...
respect and ensure the Covenant rights to all persons who may be
within their territory and to all persons subject to their jurisdiction." 0 8
This interpretation, reading Article 2(1) disjunctively to include State
actions affecting individuals both "within its territory" and/or "subject
to its jurisdiction," 09 has found support in the Inter-American

105. Kevin Jon Heller, 'One Hell of a Killing Machine': Signature Strikes and
InternationalLaw, 89 J. INT'L CRIM. JUSTICE 89, 112 (2003); Matthew Waxman,
Statement before the U.N. Human Rights Comm. (July 17, 2006), http://20012009.state.gov/g/drl/rls/70392.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2013) [hereinafter Heller,
'One Hell of a Killing Machine']; Thorpe, supra note 25, at 13.
106. ICCPR, supra note 101, art. 2(1) (emphasis added).
107. Conrad Harper, Legal Adviser, Dept. of State, Statement to U.N. Human
Rights Comm., 20 U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1405 (1995), quoted in Meagan S. Wong,
Comment, Targeted Killings and the International Legal Framework: With
ParticularReference to the US Operationagainst Osama bin Laden, 11 CJIL 127,
158 n.103 (2012).
108. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31: The Nature of
the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant 10, U.N.
Doc. CCPRC/21/Rev.1/Add. 13 (2004) (emphasis added).
109. Id.
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Commission on Human Rightslo and individual UN Human Rights

Committee communications."'
Additional support for the rejection of this interpretation is found
in the ICJ's judgment in its Wall Opinion, which stated in relation to
Article 2(1) that, "while the jurisdiction of States is primarily
territorial, it may sometimes be exercised outside the national
territory."1 1 2 The United States' purely territorial reading of Article
2(1) has also been rejected throughout academia, 113 with Milanovic
making the particularly pertinent argument that such a reading would
be contrary to the "object and purpose" of the ICCPR.114 Such
overwhelming authority against the U.S. interpretation has resulted in
calls for the United States to abandon "a stance which is increasingly
isolated from the international community."115
However, even accepting that the ICCPR binds the United States
during operations against an individual "subject to its jurisdiction," it
remains to be established that Al-Aulaqi fell within this concept.
"Subject to its jurisdiction" can be summarized as "the concept that by
exercising control and authority over an individual, the person is

110. Alejandre et al v. Cuba, Case 11.589, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report
24-25 (1999).
No. 86/99, OAS/Ser.L/V/II.104, doc. 10
111. U.N. Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Views of
the Human Rights Committee under article 5, paragraph4, of the Optional Protocol
to the InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights,
12.1-12.3, 52/1979,
CCPR/C/I 3/D/52/1979 (July 29, 1981).
112. Wall Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136,
109 (emphasis added); see
also, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 168, 219.
113. Heller, 'One Hell of a Killing Machine', supra note 105, at 112-13;
Theodor Meron, The 1994 U.S. Action in Haiti: Extraterritorialityof Human Rights
Treaties 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 78, 79 (1995); MELZER, supra note 14, at 125; Orna BenNaftali & Yuval Shany, Living in Denial: The Application of Human Rights in the
Occupied Territories, 37 ISR. L. REV. 17, 118 (2004), rejecting the similar Israeli
position with regards to the application of human rights obligations in the occupied
Palestinian Territories.
114. MARKO MILANOVIC, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS TREATIES: LAW, PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 222-228 (2011) applying Vienna

Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331;
see also LUBELL, EXTRATERRITORIAL USE OF FORCE, supra note 14, at 204-05.

115. Ramsden, supra note 28, at 393.
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brought within the jurisdiction of the State."" 6 From the jurisprudence
of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) we can cautiously
extrapolate guidance on the concept, owing to the appearance of the
phrase "within their jurisdiction" within Article 1 of the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)." 7 The jurisprudence reveals
that the acts of diplomatic and consular staff, and the detention of
individuals, fall within a State's extraterritorial jurisdiction," 8
although great controversy has surrounded measures outside this
scope, as would be the case for targeted killings. The notorious
Bankovic case,119 concerning the NATO air strikes in the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999, excluded extraterritorial air strikes
from the purview of State jurisdiction for purposes of Article 1 of the
ECHR,120 although the crux of the decision can arguably be distilled
from the ECtHR's analysis of the ECHR:
In short, the Convention is a multi-lateral treaty operating ... in an
essentially regional context and notably in the legal space (espace
juridique) of the Contracting States. The FRY clearly does not fall
within this legal space. The Convention was not designed to be
applied throughout the world, even in respect of the conduct of
Contracting States. 121
As such, there is a strong argument that the decision can be
distinguished from consideration of an ICCPR standard of "authority
and control" due to the global, as opposed to the regional, reach of the
ICCPR. The ICCPR is heralded as part of the "International Bill of
Rights," and currently has 167 State parties.1 22 On this basis, it is
submitted the decision is of limited utility.

116. LUBELL, EXTRATERRITORIAL USE OF FORCE, supra note 14, at 211

(emphasis added).
117. ECHR, supra note 101, art. 1.
118. MELZER, supra note 14, at 135-36.
119. Bankovic v. Belgium, App. No. 52207/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001).
120. Id. $ 74-82.
121. Id. $ 80.
122. United Nations Treaty Collection Database. Last accessed 17/4/13 at
<http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg-no=IV4&chapter=4&lang=en>.
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Furthermore, recent case law in the ECtHR has witnessed a
change in direction. Following the revocation of the Bankovic "espace
juridique" limitation in the Ocalan Case, 12 3 the landmark case of AlSkeini and Others v. United Kingdom1 24 truly compounded the
ECtHR's willingness to progressively interpret the Convention in light
of the challenge of globalization. The court here found a sufficient
jurisdictional nexus to bring the killings of six Iraqi civilians by
British soldiers in Iraq within the protection of the right to life
enunciated in Article 2 of the ECHR. 125 Jurisdiction was not restricted
to the one individual, Baha Mousa, who was physically detained. 126
The approach to extraterritorial jurisdiction advocated by the
ECtHR is instructive of how human rights treaties must be
purposively interpreted in the modem era. Challenges to the utility of
IHRL in relation to recent drone strikes can be convincingly
countered. While Paust has argued that the ICCPR was inapplicable to
the Bin Laden operation because the Navy Seals "did not have
effective control of Bin Laden while he was alive,"1 27 thus equating
control with detention, the response has been that such a position is
absurd because targeting someone with the intention to take their life
is the very definition of controlling an individual, body and fate, even
for the split second before their life ends.128 Requiring physical
custody for effective control "offers a perverse loophole for states to
avoid their human rights violations by operating remotely." 129 Support
for a broader, purposive interpretation of the extraterritorial
applicability of the ICCPR for targeted killings has gathered
increasing support from jurists such as Scheinin, 1o Ramsden,131
123. Ocalan v. Turkey, 2005-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at 91.
124. Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011).
125. Id. 149-150.
126. As was the finding in the UK House of Lords. Al-Skeini v. Secretary of
State for Defence, [2007] 1 A.C. 253.
127. Jordan Paust, Comment, Permissible Self Defense Targeting and the
Death ofBin Laden, 39 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 569, 581 (2011).
128. Wong, supra note 107, at 159.
129. Schaack, supra note 75, at 299-300.
130. Martin Scheinin, The ExtraterritorialEffect of the InternationalCovenant
on Civil and Political Rights, in Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights
Treaties 73, 77-78 (Fons Coomans & Menno T. Kammingaeds. eds., 2004).
131. Ramsden, supra note 28, at 393.
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Lubell,132 and Melzer.13 3 Melzer conducted a comprehensive analysis
of international jurisprudence and concluded that "[a] State exercising
sufficient factual control or power to carry out a targeted killing will
also exercise sufficient factual control to assume legal responsibility
for its failure to 'respect' the right to life of the targeted person." 34
It is therefore submitted that there are two convincing reasons for
the extraterritorial application of the ICCPR to the Al-Aulaqi targeted
killing. First, the UN Human Rights Committee, ICJ, Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, and numerous jurists have
categorically rejected the U.S. position regarding the conjunctive
reading of Article 2(1). Second, the notion of what is "within their
jurisdiction" has developed, through analogous case law of
international tribunals, to encompass the phenomenon of targeted
killings; a view that has received substantial support from a number of
distinguished jurists.
B. Application of the Substantive Obligation to Respect the Right
to Life
On the basis that the United States is bound by the ICCPR
extraterritorially, the killing of Al-Aulaqi is automatically unlawful
under the Article 6 prohibition for two reasons. First, the ICCPR
provides that the right must be "protected by law," therefore there
must be a sufficient legal basis under domestic law for the deprivation
of life.135 Second, even if there is an existing sufficient legal basis, the
provision is limited to preventing an individual from being "arbitrarily
deprived on his life." 36 While the word "arbitrary" is vague and
undefined, 13 it is accepted that a killing is not arbitrary if it conforms
to the criteria of necessity and proportionality.' 38

132. LUBELL, EXTRATERRITORIAL USE OF FORCE, supranote 14, at 223.
133. MELZER, supra note 14, at 138-39.

134. Id.
135.

MELZER, supra note 14, at 225-27.

136. ICCPR,supra note 101, at art. 6.
137. MANFRED NOWAK, UN COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS:

CCPR COMMENTARY 110-11 (2d ed. 2005); MELZER, supra note 14, at 92-93.
138. UN Study on Targeted Killings, supra note 13, 11.
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1. Sufficient Legal Basis
As highlighted in Chapter 1, the domestic justification given by
the United States is the AUMF, providing:
That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate
force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that
occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or
persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international
terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or
persons. 139
A key problem that emerges from attempting to invoke the AUMF
is the need to establish a connection between Al-Aulaqi, a member of
AQAP, and those responsible for 9/11, namely Al-Qaeda. 1 40 While
this question can be circumvented in a jus ad bellum analysis by
invoking the concept of anticipatory self-defense solely against
AQAP, the domestic legal basis here is clear; there must be a link with
9/11. As argued throughout, there are inherent difficulties in
establishing sufficient links between those operating under the AlQaeda umbrella, with some arguing that Al-Qaeda has merely become
an ideology for aspiring j ihadists. 141
There is a distinct paucity of facts in the public domain
surrounding Al-Aulaqi's potential involvement in 9/11, with recent
media reports suggesting the possibility that Al-Aulaqi bought flight
tickets for the 9/11 hijackers.' 4 2 While the evidentiary value of such
media reports is highly questionable, it must be noted that the AUMF
gives the President broad discretion to use force against "persons he
determines [ ] aided" in the 9/11 terrorist attacks.1 43 Because of this
wide-reaching discretion, coupled with the distinct lack of
139. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No.107-40 [S.J. Res
23] (2001) [hereinafter "AUMF"].
140. Ramsden, supra note 28, at 396.
141. Rollins, supra note 59, Summary Page.
142. Catherine Herridge, FBI refutes claims it suspected al-Awlaki role in
Jan. 4, 2013,
hijackers' tickets, Fox News,
purchasing 9/11
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/01/04/fbi-refutes-claims-it-suspected-alawlaki-role-in-purchasing- 11-hijackers/.
143. AUMF, supra note 139, at s2(a).
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accountability measures to challenge targeted decisions,' 44 the
evidential burden is practically non-existent. The President could have
had sufficient evidence to make such a determination. However,
without public evidence, the answer remains unclear and unsatisfying.
2. Necessity
The UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Killings states that
"[tihe necessity requirement imposes an obligation to minimize the
level of force used, regardless of the amount that would be
proportionate . ., .145 This requirement imposes a two-fold duty: first,
to exhaust all non-lethal measures before resorting to lethal force; and
second, to only use lethal force in response to an ongoing or imminent
attack.146
In applying the requirement of exhausting non-lethal measures,
the UN Human Rights Committee in Suarez de Guerrero v.
Colombial4 7 found that the killing of seven suspected kidnappers, by
police officers at point blank range and without warning or an
opportunity to surrender, was "arbitrary" for the purposes of Article 6
of the ICCPR.148 On the known facts about the Al-Aulaqi strike, while
the United States cites the impossibility of capture as a pre-requisite
for a drone strike against a U.S. citizen,149 there is no evidence that
such an attempt was made, or even that Al-Aulaqi was given a
warning or opportunity to surrender at the time of the incident.
However, there is an emerging view in the literature surrounding
targeted killings that when capture or incapacitation is not feasible, the
duty to employ non-lethal means is fulfilled. 50 While this view is far
144. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C., 2010) (noting that
targeting decisions are non-justiciable).
145. Alston, supra note 14, at 11.
146. Ramsden, supra note 28, at 400-05.
147. Husband of Maria Fanny Suarez de Guerrero v. Colombia, Judgments
U.N. Admin. Trib., No. 40, at 137, U.N. Doc. AT/37/40 (1982).
148. Id. 13.1-13.3.
149. DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 26, at 1.

150. Alston, supra note 14, at 28; Heller, 'One Hell of a Killing Machine',
supra note 105, at 116-17; Ramsden, supra note 28, at 404-05. This could also be
equated with Melzer's concept of 'qualitative necessity,' requiring that 'other means
remain ineffective or without any promise of achieving the purpose of the
operation.' MELZER, supra note 14, at 5, 228.
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from established in international law, it provides a means of
combating those connected with terrorist activities that are able to
frustrate law enforcement operations by intentionally taking refuge in
States that are "unwilling or unable" to bring them to justice. Even
accepting this view, it could be argued that capturing Al-Aulaqi was
feasible. While it was reported that for much of 2009 and 2010,
capturing Al-Aulaqi was "nearly impossible" due to his integration
into a powerful Yemeni tribe,' 5 1 the strike against Al-Aulaqi was in a
remote area of Yemen, 152 away from the potential of causing civilian
casualties (except Samir Khan),1 53 and away from the dangers of
catastrophic losses to the U.S. armed forces. In this scenario there is a
strong argument that the United States could have captured Al-Aulaqi,
opposed to the instant use of lethal force.
The question regarding imminence is equally controversial, and
two approaches can be extrapolated from the current discourse. The
traditional approach is one of absolute temporal necessity, 154 where
"imminence encompasses a person literally in the process of using
deadly force." 155 This view reflects the origins of the law enforcement
paradigm, whereby a police officer would be faced with an individual
who is directly posing a threat to life, such as Ewald K., who was
killed during a standoff with Swiss Police in 2000.156
A more progressive approach, adapting the law enforcement
paradigm to accommodate the phenomenon of terrorism and the
planning of potentially devastating attacks, is advocated by Ramsden.
151. Mark Mazzetti, Eric Schmitt & Robert Worth, Two- Year Manhunt Led to
Killing of Awlaki in Yemen, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2011, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/201 1/10/01/world/middleeast/anwar-al-awlaki-is-killed-inyemen.html?pagewanted=all.
152. Id.
153. The Israeli Supreme Court made clear that a State must take into account
the potential for civilian casualties when considering the feasibility of an operation
to capture. HCJ 769/02 Public Committee Against Torture v. Israel, Judgment, 40
[2005].
154. McCann v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 149 (1995); Alejandre v.
Cuba, Case 11,580, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 86/99,
OAS/Ser.L/V/II. 104, doc. 10 42.
155. Ramsden, supra note 28, at 403; see also Heller, 'One Hell of a Killing
Machine, supra note 105, at 116.
156. See the full description of the incident in MELZER, supra note 14, at 43738.
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He submits that "[t]he concept of imminence will vary taking into
account the gravity of the threat, the limited opportunity to
incapacitate a known terrorist leader, and a pattern of previous attacks
157
providing a strong inference thatfuture attacks are planned."
Similar accounts are identifiable throughout academia, 5 8 with
Chesney arguing the slightly stricter construction that "the state must
have substantial evidence to support the belief that the person in
question will in fact be involved in further attacks, but the state should
not be expected to stay its hand until plot-specific details emerge." 159
The common denominator among such views is that a relaxation of
the imminence criterion is necessary to take account of the perpetual
difficulties and limited opportunities available in combating terrorism.
However, all appear to agree that there must be a reasonable evidential
burden on the State.
The U.S. formulation of imminence "does not require the United
States to have clear evidence that a specific attack on U.S. persons and
interests will take place in the immediate future".' 6 0 Therefore,
evidence that an individual is continually planning attacks against the
United States, and has not renounced his intention to continue
planning attacks, is sufficient to fulfill the criterion of imminence. 161
While far beyond the traditional approach, this view is somewhat
reconcilable with the progressive approach taken to imminence.
However, it must be questioned how far below the standard of "clear
evidence" the U.S. position slides. Should the United States authorize
attacks without a "strong inference that future attacks are planned," 62
then the U.S. view would even surpass the progressive interpretation.
The paucity of information in the public domain surrounding the
intelligence informing the Al-Aulaqi strike is once more an obstacle in
analysis. However, the United States would have a strong argument
under the progressive conception of imminence that it had the
subjective belief, reasonably deduced from objective evidence of past
157.
158.
Chesney,
159.
160.
161.
162.

Ramsden, supra note 28, at 406 (emphasis added).
Heller, 'One Hell of A Killing Machine', supra note 105, at 116;
supra note 90, at 55.
Chesney, supra note 90, at 55.
DOJ WHTE PAPER, supra note 26, at 7; Rylatt, supra note 26.
Id. at 8.
Ramsden, supra note 28, at 406.
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attacks and a failure to repudiate his role, that the killing of Al-Aulaqi
was necessary. Nevertheless, such a final conclusion should not be
hastily reached. The progressive approach is, as of yet, purely
academic, containing a distinct paucity of hard law.
3. Proportionality
With regards to the final requirement of justifying the targeted
killing of Al-Aulaqi, the UN Special Rapporteur has stated that "the
proportionality requirement limits the permissible level of force based
on the threat posed by the suspect to others." 63 The threat posed by
Al-Aulaqi was clear. As an alleged senior operational leader of AlQaeda, Al-Aulaqi was tied to various attempts on U.S. lives, including
the attempted Christmas Day "Shoebombing," which would have
resulted in significant civilian casualties.' 64 Ramsden argued prior to
the killing that the United States is further entitled to take into account
factors such as AQAP claims that it has "conducted extensive research
and trials into thwarting airport screening,"' 65 and the "strategy of a
thousand cuts" to attack the United States with small, yet frequent,
operations revealed in Inspire magazine.1 66 On the basis of such facts,
there is a strong argument that the Al-Aulaqi strike was proportionate
to the continuing threat he posed to U.S. persons and interests.
Before concluding, a key distinction must be made between
proportionality under IHRL and jus in bello. While it may cautiously
be stated that a level of "collateral damage" is acceptable under the
latter,167 this concept is foreign to IHRL.168 The death of any
163. Alston, supra note 14, at 11.
164. 278 passengers were aboard the targeted Northwest Airlines Flight 253.
Anahad O'Connor and Eric Schmitt, Terror Attempt Seen as Man Tries to Ignite
Device
on
Jet,
N.Y
TIMES
(Dec.
26,
2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/26/us/26plane.html.
165. Ramsden, supra note 28, at 399 (citing Khaled Wassef, Al Qaeda in
Yemen Touts "Anti-Detectable" Bomb, CBS NEWS (Feb.16, 2010),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503543_162-6212340-503543.html).
166. Ramsden, supra note 28, at 399 (citing Factbox: Qaeda Unveils
"Strategy of A Thousand Cuts", REUTERS (Nov. 21, 2010, 4:39 PM)
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/11/21/us-yemen-qaeda-plotidUSTRE6AK2CU20101121).
167. "Launching an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof,
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individual other than the target would be a breach of IHRL.1 69 The
result of this distinction is that in the Al-Aulaqi strike, the death of
Samir Khan would prima facie breach IHRL. While Samir Khan was
the editor of the AQAP magazine Inspire, the United States openly
admitted that he was not a sufficiently significant target to be targeted
individually. 170 As such, the killing of Samir Khan was a breach of
IHRL as an indiscriminate extra-judicial killing.
C. Conclusion
In conclusion, there are strong arguments to rebut the U.S.
position that the ICCPR does not apply extraterritorially, evidenced by
the interpretative comments of the HRC and the progressive
jurisprudence of the ECtHR discussing the application of the lexically
identical provision enunciated in the ECHR. Consequently, the view
that the United States is bound by the obligation to respect the right to
life in extraterritorial drone strikes is reverberating around academia
as logical and necessary.
In applying the substantive obligation of Article 6, the law once
again displays a sharp divide between those favoring either a
traditional or progressive approach to concepts such as imminence and
necessity. Underlying the application of Article 6 are the recurring
evidential difficulties apparent from the jus ad bellum analysis with
regards to the 'imminence' of a potential attack. Nevertheless, there
are substantial arguments to suggest that the United States would find
it difficult to justify the strike under all three triggers of sufficient
legal basis, necessity, and proportionality.

which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated, is prohibited;" see 1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALDBECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 46 (2005).

168. Heller, 'One Hell ofa Killing Machine,' supra note 105, at 114.

169. Id.
170. Mark Mazzetti et al., How A U.S. Citizen Came to Be in America's Cross
Hairs, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/10/world/
middleeast/anwar-al-awlaki-a-us-citizen-in-americas-cross-hairs.html?_r-0.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol44/iss2/2

30

Rylatt: An Evaluation of the U.S. Policy of "Targeted Killing" under Inte

2014] AN EVALUATION OF THE U.S. POLICY OF "TARGETED KILLING" 145
CONCLUSION

The preceding analysis has sought to advocate an approach
requiring the application of the frameworks of jus ad bellum and
IHRL to the targeted killing of Anwar Al-Aulaqi. In each framework,
the broader inherent tensions between pre- and post-9/11 conceptions
of the legal issues have been investigated, before narrowing the
investigation to focus on the application of the lex lata to the AlAulaqi killing itself.
Chapter 1 analyzed the legal justifications of the United States,
revealing both the domestic and international justifications for the AlAulaqi strike, identified from administration remarks and policy
documents, such as the controversial DOJ White Paper. While
accepting the applicability of jus ad bellum and providing
justifications under self-defense, it was clear that the United States
viewed the strike as part of the global NIAC with Al-Qaeda under the
jus in bello regime, thus excluding the applicability of IHRL. The
analysis identified fundamental questions permeating all three legal
frameworks, most notably the geographical scope of NIAC and the
U.S. conception of imminence, to provide a basis for analysis in
further chapters.
Chapter 2 analyzed the framework of jus ad bellum to establish
whether self-defense could be successfully invoked to justify an
incursion into Yemeni territory. Post-9/11 academic discourse
witnessed the emergence of a deep doctrinal divide between those
who favor a traditional inter-State approach, based around the UN
Charter and those who posit a wider customary right of self-defense,
which may be invoked against non-State actors. While the
jurisprudence of the ICJ supports the prior position, substantial State
practice and opiniojuris spanning 175 years was identified to suggest
the contrary approach might in fact have crystalized into customary
international law.
The parameters of self-defense are also wrought with tension.
While it may be that the action was both proportional and necessary,
on the basis of the "failing" State of Yemen's inability to adequately
prevent threats emanating, there are strong arguments to suggest that
the Al-Aulaqi strike lacked the imminence to be either in response to
9/11, or as a purely anticipatory measure. It is concluded, in lieu of
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clear evidence to the contrary, that the strike crossed into the unlawful
realms of pre-emptive self-defense.
Chapter 3 analyzed the framework of jus in bello to evaluate the
U.S. invocation of a global NIAC with Al-Qaeda, to trigger the more
permissive framework of IHL. Strong arguments were elucidated from
both the travauxprdparatoiresand lex posteriorto Common Article 3
of the Geneva Conventions to support the position that a NIAC
contains a territorial limitation, consequently precluding a NIAC ever
being global in nature. Alternative arguments, albeit outside the scope
of U.S. formal justifications, were considered, such as whether the
United States could legitimately claim to be in a localized NIAC with
AQAP in Yemen, or was intervening to support the Yemeni
government engaged in a NIAC with AQAP. The support for these
arguments is far from compelling, and it was concluded that neither
provide a justification for U.S. actions. In terms of the former, the
situation has not crossed the threshold from sporadic acts of terrorism
and counter-terrorism into the realms of NIAC. As to the latter, the
United States was clearly acting to protect their own persons.
Consequently, the rules of IiHL do not govern the Al-Aulaqi strike.
Chapter 4 analyzed the framework of IHRL, with particular focus
on U.S. obligations to respect the right to life under the ICCPR. While
the United States has fervently denied the extraterritorial application
of the ICCPR, strong arguments were identified that this position is
archaic and unsustainable. In application of the legal framework, it
was concluded that the United States would find it difficult to justify
the strike, particularly noting the strict, traditional approach to "heat of
the moment" imminence in IHRL. While the strike may be justifiable
under the weaker evidential burdens promulgated under progressive
approaches, this view cannot be accepted as part of the lex lata. As
such, there are compelling arguments for the proposition that the
strike against Anwar Al-Aulaqi breached IHRL.
While the above conclusions serve utility in establishing both the
lex lata of international law and the legality of the Al-Aulaqi strike,
they should not be viewed as confined to the events of September 30,
2011. Drone warfare is a matter of lex ferenda in international law,
showing no sign of ceasing.17 1 As such, the above conclusions should

171. Sources such as the Long War Journal are receiving daily updates of
further strikes spanning Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. Foundationfor
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be utilized as a context to consider reform of U.S. policy. While
reform is largely outside the aims of this Article, one key point is now
made.
Permeating the conclusions reached in this Article is a paucity of
public information, and the unwillingness of the United States to
reveal the true intelligence behind the strike. This lack of transparency
has been compounded by decisions in both United States and United
Kingdom courts rendering targeting decisions non-justiciable, 172 and
this lack of transparency has been met with growing scepticism and
opposition from the international community. 173 Regardless of how
reform is affected, through "drone courts"l 74 or otherwise, one point is
clear; the United States must meet the calls reverberating around the
world for transparency, accountability, and above all, justice. 7 5

Defense of Democracies,LONG WAR JOURNAL, http://www.longwarjoumal.org (last
visited Apr. 4, 2013).

172.
v. Sec'y
(Eng.).
173.
Pakistan.

Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 2010); R (Noor Khan)
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, [2012] EWHC 3728
The United States has recently received criticism for strikes carried out in
AFP, Red Cross Chief Criticises US' Drone Use in Pakistan, ExPRESS

TRIB., (Apr. 16, 2013), http://tribune.com.pk/story/536312/red-cross-chief-criticisesus-drone-use-in-pakistan.
174. Jeh Johnson, A "Drone Court": Some Pros and Cons, Address at

Fordham Law School (Mar. 18, 2013), available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/
2013/03/jeh-johnson-speech-on-a-drone-court-some-pros-and-cons/.
175. Alston, supra note 14, at 27-29; HCJ 769/02 Public Comm. Against
Torture in Israel v. Gov't of Israel,
40 [2006], available at
http://elyonl.court.gov.il/FilesENG/02/690/007/A34/02007690.A34.pdf;
David
Kaye, InternationalLaw Issues in the Department of Justice White Paper on
Targeted Killing, 17 AM. SoC'Y OF INT'L L. (Feb. 15, 2013) available at
http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/17/issue/8/intemational-law-issuesdepartment-justice-white-paper-targeted-killing.
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